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BURDENED, BUT NOT BURDENED ENOUGH:
A LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO THE DIFFICULTIES
POSED BY RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS
TO RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
NATHAN DOWNEY
I. Introduction
Imagine a religion that for millennia has viewed oil as a Satanic object.
Next, imagine a government forcing the adherents of that religion to drink
oil directly from a pipeline. This hypothetical scenario illustrates the reality
of the substantial burdens the government places on Native American
religious beliefs that oppose resource development. Although many
advocates have attempted to alter the “substantial burden” test used in many
of these cases, this article suggests a more permanent, long-lasting solution:
ensure the claimants religion is bona fide and give more weight to property
claims made by Native American religious groups.
Religious objections to resource development are no strangers to the U.S.
court system, but such a case has yet to reach the Supreme Court. Although
on-point cases have reached the Ninth Circuit,1 the Third Circuit,2 and a
couple of federal district courts,3 existing case law generally disfavors
claimants asserting a religious hardship; it imposes an almost impossible
 University of Oklahoma College of Law, J.D. Candidate 2023.
1. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008); Snoqualmie
Indian Tribe v. F.E.R.C., 545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008).
2. Adorers of the Blood of Christ v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm'n, 897 F.3d 187 (3d
Cir. 2018).
3. Apache Stronghold v. United States, 519 F. Supp. 3d 591 (D. Ariz. 2021); Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 239 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 2017).
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standard. The substantial burden test allows anything short of governmentforced oil drinking during religious rituals.4 To cure the case law’s
imbalance, courts should establish a mode of analysis that gives claimants
with a sincere religious objection—those with no real alternative to seeing
their religious beliefs freely practiced—a way to succeed against opposed
resource development. Two categories of religious claims emerge when
analyzing assertions against resource development: Native American claims
and those made by progressive religious groups—defined for the purposes
of this article as groups part of “a new wave of progressive activism guided
by religious freedom” that seek “new ways to achieve political or social
change under RFRA protections.”5 Native American claimants often hold
sincere religious objections to resource development, but their causes are
likely withheld; to allow religious objections to overpower resource
development involves enormous policy considerations. A prime example is
progressive religious groups’ willingness to assert politically-motivated,
newly-created claims of religious requirements and convictions makes it
less likely Native American claimants will succeed.
This comment addresses why Native American religious objections to
energy development fail, and what needs to change for them to hold
validity in the law. It looks at both the Native American and progressive
religious groups’ attempts to challenge energy development, and why the
latter’s attempts to assert claims may harm the viability of legitimate,
longstanding Native American claims. The comment outlines the standard
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) requires for a violative
burden on religion, and how an alteration in the established law could affect
religious claimants opposed to energy. In section II, I recount a brief history
of RFRA and outline the requirements for a successful claim. In section III,
I survey the caselaw for Native American religious objections, followed by
those made by progressive religious groups. In section IV, I first analyze
these cases by first laying out the need for sincerely held native American
beliefs to be practiced, followed by an explanation of why claims have
failed, and then by delving into sincerity and its effects. In section V, I
4. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008)
(finding no substantial burden partially because “the Forest Service ‘has guaranteed that
religious practitioners would still have access to the Snowbowl,’” a sacred site now covered
in recycled sewage water); Apache Stronghold v. United States, 519 F.Supp. 591, 607 (D.
Ariz. 2021) (finding no substantial burden despite the mining plans having “a devastating
effect on the Apache people’s religious practices”).
5. See Colin Sheehan, The Pros and Cons of Empowering Religious Exemptions for
Progressive Activism, 21 Rutgers J. L. & Religion 549, 551, 557 (2021).
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predict the future of these issues by outlining the current developments in
relevant caselaw, explaining their effects, examining the implications of
progressive religious claims, and recommending a path for the courts.
II. Background
A. RFRA History
Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in
response to the Supreme Court’s holding in Employment Division v. Smith
because it “virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify
burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion.”6 In
Smith, the Court held that a law of general applicability may stand valid—
even though in this case the law prohibited the ceremonial ingestion of
peyote in line with a Native American religion—because the law only
“incidentally” prohibits the religious practice and “is not specifically
directed to religious practice and is otherwise constitutional as applied to
those who engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons.”7 Prior to
Smith, the Court “used a balancing test that took into account whether the
challenged action imposed a substantial burden on the practice of religion,
and if it did, whether it was needed to serve a compelling government
interest.”8 In two key cases, “the Court held in Sherbert that an employee
who was fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath could not be denied
unemployment benefits,”9 and “in Yoder, the Court held that Amish
children could not be required to comply with a state law demanding that
they remain in school until the age of 16 even though their religion required
them to focus on uniquely Amish values and beliefs during their formative
adolescent years.”10 However, the Court in Smith rejected Sherbert on the
basis “that use of the Sherbert test whenever a person objected on religious
grounds to the enforcement of a generally applicable law ‘would open the
prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic
obligations of almost every conceivable kind.’”11 As a result of these
changes, “Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 in order to provide very broad

6. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb (West).
7. Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990).
8. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693 (2014).
9. Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963).
10. Id. at 694 (2014) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
11. Id. (quoting Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 888 (1990)).
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protection for religious liberty”12 and to ensure “Congress’ view of the right
to free exercise under the First Amendment.”13
B. Requirements for a Successful Claim
“Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court’s decision” in
Smith.14 RFRA states that the government cannot:
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the
government can demonstrate that application of the burden to the
person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.15
Unnecessary economic consequences,16 compelling a business to violate
their free exercise of religion,17 and forcing a group to either violate its
beliefs or curtail its mission18 all qualify as a violation of the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment. Under RFRA, a law of general applicability
may still burden a person’s free exercise of religion, reinstating the previous
standard that Smith changed.19 A substantial burden, however, can be
shown either by the fact that the government’s action compelled the
adherent to commit an act prohibited by the religion, or where the
government prohibits an act mandated by the religious belief.20
A baseline look at sincerity is essential to ensure an asserted stance or
belief is rooted in a religion and deserving of First Amendment protections.
In order for a religious objection to succeed, the “plaintiff must allege a
constitutionally impermissible burden on a sincerely held religious
belief.”21 Furthermore, there is only a “Free Exercise claim if . . . the
plaintiff holds a belief, not a preference, that is sincerely held and religious
in nature, not merely secular.”22 Indeed, the “First Amendment only
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
(2018).
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 693 (2014).
Tanzin v. Tanzir, 141 S. Ct 486, 489 (2020).
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 (West).
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 720 (2014).
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado C.R. Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1720
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1876 (2021).
Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 at 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2008).
GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1256 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id.
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protects sincerely held beliefs that are ‘rooted in religion.’”23 Religious
beliefs “need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to
others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”24 The religious
beliefs in question must be “actually religious in nature (rather than
philosophical or political, for example)” and not stated “for the purpose of
draping religious garb” over nonreligious activity.25 Additionally, the First
Amendment does not protect “so-called religions which tend to mock
established institutions and are obviously shams and absurdities and whose
members are patently devoid of religious sincerity.”26 The sincerity analysis
essentially delineates nonreligious claims from religious ones.
The Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder considered the sincerity of an
Amish religious conviction that their children should not be compelled to
attend public school beyond grade eight.27 Although affected by a law of
general applicability requiring all children attend school through a certain
age, the Court allowed an exception for the Amish because of the sincerity
of their beliefs and the evidence of the adequacy of their alternative
lifestyle.28 Notably, the Court did not question the sincerity of the Amish’s
beliefs, and the government itself even conceded that the Amish beliefs
were indeed sincere.29 In Yoder, the Amish believed that sending their
children to high school in compliance with the law would “endanger their
own salvation and that of their children.”30 The main issue in the Amish’s
case was not the sincerity of their beliefs, but whether the state properly and
reasonably exercised its government power to require education until the
age of sixteen.31 Nevertheless, the Court took it as an opportunity to delve
into the factors it evaluates to determine whether a belief is sincere and
religious in nature.
One important factor guiding the Court was the longstanding nature of
the belief.32 The belief must also originate from a bona fide religion.33 In

23. United States v. DeWitt, 95 F.3d 1374 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Thomas v. Review
Bd. Of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981).
24. Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
25. United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016).
26. Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1003
(1974).
27. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
28. Id. at 235.
29. Id. at 209.
30. Id.
31. .Id. at 213.
32. Id. at 235.
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United States v. Meyers, a federal district court listed five considerations for
finding a bona fide religion: (1) ultimate ideas; (2) metaphysical beliefs; (3)
moral or ethical system; (4) comprehensiveness of beliefs; and (5)
accoutrements of religion.34 Using these factors, that court found the
plaintiff’s claims—that he was compelled by his beliefs to use drugs as a
member of the “Church of Marijuana”—were baseless. The court stated the
plaintiff’s requirements were not “religious” under RFRA, but instead
functioned as more of a philosophical belief or lifestyle.35 The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. The Circuit Court
reasoned that the district court’s factored analysis sufficiently determined
whether the plaintiff’s beliefs stemmed from a bona fide religion and stated
that “the beliefs more accurately espouse a philosophy and/or a way of life
rather than a ‘religion.’”36 Of particular note in this case is the district
court’s mention of a “slippery slope” if similar beliefs were to be
recognized as religious.37 The court stated that a future on the slippery slope
could mean “anyone who was cured of an ailment by a ‘medicine’ that had
pleasant side-effects could claim they had founded a constitutionally or
statutorily protected religion based on the beneficial ‘medicine.’”38 In
effect, First Amendment protection will not be given for inherently nonreligious claims.
III. Oil and Gas Omnipotence
A. Native American Religion
Native American groups have unsuccessfully raised anti-energy claims
on religious grounds. However, they have refused to perform acts that
negatively affect their religious practice. Regardless, courts consistently
deem Native American religious beliefs as not substantially burdened
enough to justify alternative actions by the government, but the sincerity of
such beliefs has not been an issue.

33. United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1508 (D. Wyo. 1995), aff'd, 95 F.3d
1475 (10th Cir. 1996).
34. Id. at 1502-03.
35. Id. at 1501.
36. United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1484 (10th Cir. 1996).
37. United States v. Meyers at 1484 (“Were the court to recognize Meyers’ beliefs as
religious, it might soon find itself on a slippery slope.”) (quoting Meyers, 906 F.Supp. 1494,
1508 (D. Wyo. 1995)).
38. Id. at 1508.
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Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n is a fundamental
decision involving a Native American religious objection to governmental
infringement on their land.39 In Lyng, a Native American Tribe challenged
the construction of a road through a forest sacred to their religion. 40 The
government sought to permit timber harvesting, which along with the
construction of the road would significantly impair the Tribe’s practice of
its religious beliefs.41 The forest had “historically been used by certain
American Indians for religious rituals that depend upon privacy, silence,
and an undisturbed natural setting.”42 Although acknowledging the sincerity
of the Tribe’s religious beliefs, the Court held that the burden was not
sufficient to violate the Free Exercise Clause.43 The Court reasoned that
road construction and permitting timber harvesting would not coerce the
Tribe into violating their religious beliefs. Largely, the case lacked any
specific penalty on the religion implicated “by denying any person an equal
share of rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”44 The
court refused to acknowledge the severe effects on the Native American
Tribe and instead reversed an injunction prohibiting the government action
from taking place.45 In effect, Lyng has made it very difficult for a Tribe to
successfully challenge government burdens on land that affects their
religious practices.
Although not directly about energy development, Navajo Nation v. U.S.
Forest Service has substantially impacted Native American objections to
energy development. In fact, the court’s language in this case has been used
in many different cases involving religious objections to energy
development. In Navajo Nation, a Native American Tribe made a religious
objection to recycled wastewater used to make artificial snow for a portion
of a public mountain held as sacred in its religion.46 The wastewater was
used to create artificial snow for a ski area, leading to the Tribe’s objection
and argument that allowing the wastewater’s placement would “spiritually
39. See Jeff Pinter, In Cases Involving Sites of Religious Significance, Plaintiffs Will
Fall in the Gap of Judicial Deference That Exists Between the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 29 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 289, 302 (2005) (“The controlling Supreme Court case on
the issue of government action challenged as burdening the free exercise of site specific
religious practices under the Free Exercise Clause is Lyng.”).
40. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988).
41. Id. at 453.
42. Id. at 439.
43. Id. at 447.
44. Id. at 449.
45. Id. at 458.
46. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 at 1064 (9th Cir. 2008).
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contaminate the entire mountain and devalue their religious exercises.” 47
The Ninth Circuit held that the Tribe failed to establish a RFRA violation
because there was no substantial burden imposed on their religious belief.48
The court applied Sherbert and Yoder, thereby explaining that the Tribe’s
religious beliefs were not substantially burdened because they were not
forced to choose between a government benefit and their religious belief,
nor were they threatened with criminal punishment for acting out their
religious belief.49 The Tribe did, however, hold a sincere belief.50
Nevertheless, the dissent pointed out that the majority merely looks to the
lack of physical harm directly to the Tribe.51 Further, the dissent argues that
the “emphasis on physical harm ignores the nature of religious belief and
exercise” and “characterizes the Indians’ religious beliefs and exercise as
merely a “subjective spiritual experience.”52 The court’s RFRA analysis
was misguided, creating excuses “for refusing to accept the Indians’
religion as worthy of protection under RFRA” because of its supposed
subjectiveness.53 The dissent in Navajo Nation shows both the current
consensus of Tribal religious objections and the opposing side’s view of the
actual burden that is created through the denial of such objections. Moving
forward, these arguments are essential to understanding claims made by
Native American groups asserting religious objections against resources
development.
Next, in the Ninth Circuit, a Native American Tribe challenged the
approval of a hydroelectric dam’s construction. Although renewable
energy, the court came to a similar conclusion as other energy cases.54 The
hydroelectric dam would affect a waterfall site held to be sacred by around
100 members of the Tribe, and the waterfall itself played a “central role in
the Tribe’s creation story and is an important location for its religious
practices.”55 Analyzing whether it was a substantial burden, the court
applied Navajo Nation, reasoning that the court is not concerned whether
government action impacts the Tribe’s ability to practice their religion, but
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1067.
49. Id. at 1069-70; see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972).
50. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 at 1063 (9th Cir. 2008).
51. Id. at 1096 (Fletcher, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. (Fletcher, C.J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1097 (Fletcher, C.J., dissenting).
54. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. F.E.R.C., 545 F.3d 1207, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008).
55. Id. at 1211.
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rather whether the government forces them to “choose between practicing
their religion and receiving a government benefit or coerces them into a
Catch-22 situation: exercise of their religion under fear of civil or criminal
sanction.”56 As there was no threat of loss of government benefit or
criminal sanction, the court held there was no substantial burden under
RFRA that justified requiring the government to achieve its compelling
government interest using the least restrictive means.57 Therefore, the court
allowed the dam’s construction despite the Tribe’s objections.58
Most recently and relevantly, a Native American Tribe challenged a
pipeline’s construction under a lake because it claimed the pipeline would
substantially burden the religious exercise of its members.59 The Tribe was
distressed by the construction due to a religious belief that the pipeline may
fulfill of a prophecy of a “Black Snake” that would cause destruction in
their land.60 The Tribe opposes more than a vague risk of an oil spill, it
fears the “mere presence” of the oil pipeline will “contaminate the lake’s
waters and render them unsuitable for use in their religious practices.”61
The prophecy of a destructive Black Snake was not provoked by recent
environmental concerns but had been a “long held” belief by the Tribe.62
Although the court dismissed the Tribe’s RFRA claims on procedural
grounds, it went on to state that the Tribe would not succeed on the
merits.63 The court held that the Tribe would succeed in proving its sincere
belief, but it would fail in its claim that the government’s action poses a
substantial burden on its religious exercise.64 The court applied Lyng,
holding that “the incidental effect on religious exercise of a government
action undertaken in furtherance of the management and use of government
land, even if extreme, is not alone enough to give rise to a Free Exercise
claim.”65 Standing Rock demonstrates the consensus on Native American
Tribal opposition to energy development: the opposition is unlikely to be

56. Id. at 1214; see Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir.
2008).
57. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. F.E.R.C., 545 F.3d 1207, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2008).
58. Id. at 1219-20.
59. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 239 F. Supp. 3d 77 at
85 (D.D.C. 2017).
60. Id. at 82.
61. Id. at 89.
62. Id. at 87-88.
63. Id. at 91-92.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 91.
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successful even where government actions threatens an “extreme”
incidental effect on religious exercise.
Courts often reuse the language from Navajo Nation. In Apache
Stronghold v. United States, a Native American Tribe challenged a copper
mine in an area of sacred religious ceremonial significance.66 The
government had conveyed a parcel of land to a natural resource
development company for mineral exploration, even though the parcel
contained Oak Flat, an area containing religious significance.67 In
opposition, the Tribe claimed that the resource development would
“desecrate” the land and destroy its ability to practice its religion.68 The
sincerity of the Tribe’s beliefs was not questioned, but the court held that
the Tribe failed to prove its beliefs were substantially burdened.69 The court
leaned on language from Navajo Nation to point out that a substantial
burden requires the Tribe to choose between their religious practice or a
government benefit, or threatening criminal sanction unless a contrary act
to their religion is performed.70 In Apache Stronghold, the Tribe’s claim
failed because it could not satisfy the court’s requirements of either form of
coercive action, and it held the copper mine was merely an assertion of
potential harm.71
B. Claims by Progressive Religious Groups
Even though Native American religious claims are at the forefront
against energy development, progressive religious groups are not far
behind. Progressive religious groups—defined for the purposes of this
article as groups part of “a new wave of progressive activism guided by
religious freedom” that seek “new ways to achieve political or social
change under RFRA protections”72—assert anti-energy claims that take a
different approach from Native American groups. Although courts apply a
similar substantial burden analysis on RFRA claims, they have shown a
willingness to question the sincerity of belief by progressive religious

66. Apache Stronghold v. United States, 519 F. Supp. 3d 591, 603 (D. Ariz. 2021).
67. Id. at 597.
68. Id. at 596.
69. Id. at 607.
70. Id. at 605. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir.
2008).
71. Apache Stronghold v. United States, 519 F. Supp. 3d 591, 605 (D. Ariz. 2011).
72. See Colin Sheehan, The Pros and Cons of Empowering Religious Exemptions for
Progressive Activism, 21 Rutgers J. L. & Religion 549, 551, 557 (2021).
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groups when such beliefs are not based in religion.73 Comparatively, courts
have often been reluctant to critically analyze sincerity in Native American
claims.74 Instead, courts facing Native American claims usually interpret
such religious beliefs as not sufficiently burdened enough to meet the high
threshold which would force the government to find less restrictive means.
On the other hand, in claims by progressive religious groups, courts are
willing to assert that the religious burdens are insufficient, regardless of
sincerity. In addition to these cases, progressive religious groups continue
to assert claims against energy development, including construction of the
Keystone XL pipeline that would transfer Canadian oil to the Gulf Coast,75
and the Enbridge Line 3 pipeline, also a Canadian-based project.76 The
prominence of such cases demonstrates the longevity of this category of
religious or environmental claims against energy development.
First, and most interestingly, the Third Circuit in Adorers decided a
RFRA claim brought by a group of nuns who opposed an easement given
for a natural gas pipeline through farmland they operated.77 The group
believed their religion compelled it to object to the pipeline that would run
through the group’s property.78 It also claimed that it was its duty to
preserve the environment from harmful or excessive use, and it asserted
“that their intentional decision on how to use the land ‘is an integral part of
exercising their well-established and deeply-held religious beliefs as active
and engaged stewards of God’s earth.’”79 The land had been used to
sponsor a retirement community, it had been used for farming, and the
group was compelled by their faith to use the land in a specific way that did

73. See, e.g., United States v. Hoffman, 2018 WL 2464115 at *3 (D. Ariz. June 1,
2018).
74. See Melissa R. Johnson, Positive Vibration: An Examination of Incarcerated
Rastafarian Free Exercise Claims, 34 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 391, 408
(2008) (Offering Native Americans as an example of a similar group that has not “had a
particularly difficult time persuading state prison officials that their religious beliefs are
sincerely held.”).
75. Melissa Denchak & Courtney Lindwall, What is the Keystone XL Pipeline?, NRDC
(Nov. 1, 2021), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/what-keystone-pipeline.
76. Karla Hovde, Faith spurs differing views on Line 3 pipeline, Minnesota Annual
Conference of the United Methodist Church (Sept. 2, 2021), https://www.minnesotaumc.org/
newsdetail/faith-spurs-differing-views-on-line-3-pipeline-15405055.
77. Adorers of the Blood of Christ v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm'n, 897 F.3d 187, 191
(3d Cir. 2018).
78. Id. at 189.
79. Id. at 191 (citation omitted).
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not include a natural gas pipeline.80 The court decided the case against the
nuns on procedural grounds; finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it
avoided a decision on the merits of the underlying RFRA claim.81 Notably,
the court did not question the nuns’ religious sincerity, but it instead
focused on the procedural defect.82
Despite different central focuses, other RFRA claims by progressive
religious groups maintain a similar theme to those used in energy-based
claims. In United States v. Hoffman, a group faced criminal charges for
leaving food in the desert for undocumented border crossers.83 The group
did not attempt to get permits to access the wildlife refuge where the event
occurred, and there was no denial because of a religious belief.84 Initially,
the magistrate judge rejected their RFRA defense because it was motivated
more by politics and there were alternatives to fulfill their convictions.85
However, the District Court reversed the magistrate judge’s decision and
held that their beliefs were religious, sincere, and the government did not
demonstrate that its actions furthered a compelling interest.86 The court
used language from Navajo Nation, reasoning that the accepted sincere
religious beliefs were valid, but there was no burden for the limited access
to the wildlife refuge.87 The group initially had their sincerity questioned,
but instead the court decided to evaluate only the burden on their religious
beliefs.88
Additionally, in United States v. Kelly, several members of a progressive
religious group89 were charged with trespass and depredation of
government property after they broke into a naval installation holding

80. Id.
81. Id. at 196.
82. Id. at 187, footnote 10 (“nothing in this opinion should be construed to call into
question the sincerity of the deeply-held religious beliefs expressed by the Adorers”).
83. United States v. Hoffman, No. MJ-17-0339-TUC-BGM, 2018 WL 2464115 at *1
(D. Ariz. June 1, 2018)
84. Id. at *3.
85. Id.
86. United States v. Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1289 (D. Ariz. 2020).
87. United States v. Hoffman, No. MJ-17-0339-TUC-BGM, 2018 WL 2464115 at *3
(D. Ariz. June 1, 2018). See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th
Cir. 2008).
88. Id. at *3.
89. See United States v. Kelly, No. 2:18-CR-22, 2019 WL 5077546 at *1 (S.D. Ga. Apr.
26, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. CR 2:18-022, 2019 WL 4017424 (S.D.
Ga. Aug. 26, 2019). (“Defendants are members of the Plowshares Movement, a Christian
protest and activism group opposed to nuclear weaponry.”).
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submarine missiles.90 The government argued that those who broke into the
installation lacked a sincere belief that their actions were “religious
exercise.”91 In Kelly, the claimants argued that “rather than trust in God for
safety and security, Defendants believe the United States has placed its faith
in nuclear weapons.”92 Nonetheless, the court decided to not question the
sincerity of their religious convictions, but it instead reasoned that the
members’ course of action—cutting the locks and fences to enter—was not
the only way that their belief-compelled actions could be accomplished.93
Specifically, the protesters failed to verify whether there was a valid lessrestrictive means before they took action.94 The Eleventh Circuit later took
up the case and found no dispute to the fact “that the defendants were
exercising sincerely held religious beliefs, the government substantially
burdened the defendants’ religious exercise, and the government has a
compelling interest.”95 However, the Circuit concluded that “it would be
impossible to achieve all of the government’s compelling interests in the
safety and security of the Kings Bay naval base, its base personnel, and its
base assets, and also accommodate the defendants’ destructive religious
exercise in this case.”96 The government’s “interest of the highest order”
was too compelling to allow the free practice of their sincere religious
beliefs.97 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defendants’
convictions.98
IV. Analysis of Cases and Claims
A. The Need to Allow Sincere Native American Beliefs to be Practiced
Native American objections to resource development are sparsely
established by case law, but they crop up where the government impairs a
Native American group’s longstanding practices such that the group’s
ability to freely exercise its religion is substantially burdened. Dissecting
the beliefs of a religion is not only outside the purview of courts;99courts
90. Id. at *3.
91. Id. at *19.
92. Id. at *3.
93. Id. at *26.
94. Id. at *29.
95. United States v. Grady, 18 F.4th 1275, 1285 (11th Cir. 2021).
96. Id. at 1288.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1295.
99. Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) (“Courts
should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs.”).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

98

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 8

have repeatedly stated that such determinations are harmful and too farreaching.100 When both courts and outsiders attempt to dissect and
understand Native American beliefs—which are often quite different than
other religions and involve land and location in a central manner 101—their
ways of life and religious dedications can be severely altered.102
Thiry v. Carlson demonstrates the potential danger of caselaw hostile to
valid religious liberty claims. In Thiry, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
dissected and interpreted the theology of the established Native American
religion to justify its stance that the substantial burden was not substantial
enough.103 The Thirys “practice[d] many tenets of American Indian
spirituality which includes . . . the sanctity of gravesites.”104 However, the
government planned “condemnation action” and “construction of planned
highway improvements” that required the Thirys to exhume, transport, and
rebury their daughter.105 In its analysis, the court stated that “[t]heir
American Indian spirituality and Christian beliefs allow for the moving of
gravesites when necessary.”106 Additionally, as the Thirys also adhered to
Quakerism, the court pointed out that “a basic tenet of Quakerism is that
God is within individuals and one particular location is no more or less
sacred than another.”107 Indeed, the court delved into and determined what
religious practices were most important for the Thirys despite a strong basis
of caselaw that prohibits such analysis.108 The court used this religious
analysis to cast aside the Thirys’ claim.109

100. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (“For good reason,
we have repeatedly refused to take such a step.”); Employment Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. Of
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have
warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a
religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.”); Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680 (1989)
(“It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to
a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”).
101. See Sarah B. Gordon, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of
Public Lands, 94 L.J. 1447, 1448 (1985) (“Native American religions view gods, people, and
nature as an integral whole.”).
102. Id. at 1449 (“actual spiritual residence in . . . certain locations makes the destruction
of an Indian sacred site a cataclysmic event”).
103. Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1496 (10th Cir. 1996).
104. Id. at 1493.
105. Id. at 1494.
106. Id. at 1496.
107. Id. at 1495-96.
108. See, supra, Footnote 99.
109. Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1496 (10th Cir. 1996).
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Moreover, Congress has expressed that the religious practices of Native
Americans ought to be defended. Specifically, the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) provides that “it shall be the policy of the
United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent
right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional
religions . . . including . . . the freedom to worship through ceremonials and
traditional rites.”110 However, the statute itself does not create rights that
Native American claimants can enforce against the government’s
encroachment on their free exercise of religion.111 In Lyng, the Court
discussed AIRFA, outlining how the bill’s sponsor had explained that “the
bill would not ‘confer special religious rights on Indians,’ would ‘not
change any existing State or Federal law,’ and in fact ‘has no teeth in it.’”112
In effect, AIRFA “merely requires that agencies consider” Native American
religious values that conflict with federal agencies adopting certain land
uses.113 Additionally, it does not provide any more protection than that of
the First Amendment.114 Although AIRFA expresses the policy that Native
American religious beliefs have value deserving of consideration, such
consideration is shallow and does not effectively protect such beliefs.
Courts often minimize and trivialize Native American religious beliefs in
the “substantial burden” cases. Such cases arise in an increasing number
and crop up in developing areas, especially since much of their historic
land—even land that holds immense longstanding, spiritual significance—
is no longer under their ownership.115 Compounding the issue, some courts
have loosely applied the “substantial burden” standard due to no clear
definition existing in RFRA or caselaw.116 For example, in Navajo Nation
the court concluded “that spraying up to 1.5 million gallons of treated
sewage effluent per day on Humphrey’s Peak, the most sacred of the San
Francisco Peaks, does not impose a “substantial burden” on the Indians’
110. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996 (West).
111. Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 920 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
112. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988)
(quoting 124 Cong. Rec. 21444 (1978)).
113. Spiritual practice-based protection, American Indian Law Deskbook § 3:18 (July
2021).
114. Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 1983).
115. See Spiritual practice-based protection, American Indian Law Deskbook § 3:18
(July 2021).
116. See Tiernan Kane, Right by Precedent, Wrong by RFRA: The “Substantial Burden”
Inquiry in Oklevueha Native American Church of Hawaii, Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012 (9th
Cir. 2016), 40 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 793, 798 (2017).
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‘exercise of religion.’”117 However, it was “clear that their religious beliefs
and practice do not merely require the continued existence of certain plants
and shrines. They require that these plants and shrines be spiritually pure,
undesecrated by sewage effluent.”118 If the court was willing to
acknowledge the fact that such acts were a sufficiently substantial burden to
the constitutionally-protected free exercise of religion, the claim would
have been successful. With the interpretation of a “substantial burden,”
courts advance an agenda that degrades Native American beliefs and
culminates in the loss of sacred sites forever.
Courts can fix this and recognize valid religious objections of Native
American groups without threatening the very framework of our society.
Despite the government arguing that allowing success in such objections
would lead to the inability of essential government interests to stand,119 in
reality many of these claims are land-based and only expand at the rate of
further development into formerly undeveloped areas.120 Moreover,
government action has the potential to impair or destroy the “entire
religious beliefs” of Native Americans.121 Comparatively, progressive
religious groups’ claims are often philosophically compelled and merely
implicate land as a byproduct,122 and they usually don’t involve land
whatsoever.123 As a result, the number of potential claims by progressive
religious groups is endless.124 Additionally, the need for recognition of
117. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 at 1096 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fletcher,
C.J., dissenting).
118. Id. (Fletcher, C.J., dissenting).
119. See Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1992);
U.S. v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1484 (10th Cir. 1996).
120. See Michelle Kay Albert, Obligations and Opportunities to Protect Native American
Sacred Sites Located on Public Lands, 40 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 479, 521 (2009) (“As
the population of the West grows, urban sprawl spreads, wild places dwindle, and our need
for natural resources accelerates, the pressure . . . to disregard or inadequately protect
American Indian sacred sites will only grow.”).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Adorers of the Blood of Christ v. FERC, 897 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2018)
(“their deeply-held religious beliefs require that they care for the land”); United States v.
Kelly, 2019 WL 5077546 at *21 (S.D. Ga. 2019) (“their actions attempting to ‘reconsecrate’
the land were, consequently, sacramental actions, in Defendants’ view”).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Hoffman, 2018 WL 2464115 at *3 (D. Ariz. 2018) (“they
have a moral, ethical, and spiritual belief to assist humans in need of basic necessities”).
124. See Colin Sheehan, The Pros and Cons of Empowering Religious Exemptions for
Progressive Activism, 21 Rutgers J. L. & Religion 549, 557 (2021) (“As more courts
recognize the legitimacy of a RFRA defense for progressive causes, activists can look for
new ways to achieve political and social change under RFRA protections.”).
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Native American claims can be accommodated without making government
ineffective in accomplishing its goals and taking large swaths of land from
its control. In Lyng, the Court was concerned with the Native American
religious objection to timber harvesting in a sacred forest, but it reasoned
that “[n]o disrespect for these practices is implied when one notes that such
beliefs could easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some rather
spacious tracts of public property.”125 The district court’s order prevented
timber harvesting and road construction on more than 17,000 acres of
land.126 Conversely, granting a religious objection would not require the
entire 17,000 acres if the government focused on the claim itself and not on
some hypothetical worst-case scenario created to justify its decisions.
However, a sort of middle ground should be pursued to ensure that a
religious objection by a Native American tribe is not completely ignored for
want of a more serious religious burden. More consideration of Native
American religious claims, while analyzing and giving a baseline look at
sincerity and roots in longstanding religious beliefs and traditions, along
with a tighter matching of the government’s actions to the burden caused,
may indeed lead to a more beneficial outcome. For example, in Lyng the
Court could have allowed a smaller-scale intrusion on the Native American
religion while protecting large, less important swaths of the forest. Such a
compromise would not be “courting anarchy” by granting exemptions to all
laws.127 Nor would it send the United States down a “slippery slope” that
would lead to the creation of a religious belief for the purposes of bypassing
a law.128
B. Why Claims Have Failed
Religious objections to energy development continuously fail for a
number of reasons. First, claimants who assert a religious objection are
rarely subject to a sufficiently “substantial burden” in the current RFRA
framework. Second, Native American groups asserting religious claims
usually do not have property rights to the land where the government action
takes place, negatively affecting the importance that the government will
give to their claims. Third, progressive religious groups deter the courts’
use of a more solid framework in essential claims because they compel
courts to continue a trend of disregarding longstanding claims.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988).
Id.
See Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1992).
See U.S. v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1484 (10th Cir. 1996).
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First, due to the current definition of a substantial burden under the
RFRA framework, the courts disregard many objections to energy
development. There is no definite framework in RFRA for establishing
what a substantial burden is either in its text or as defined by the Supreme
Court.129 In fact, even in Standing Rock, the D.C. District Court used preRFRA caselaw to determine which substantial burden standard to use,
holding that the standard was not met.130 The standard used in Lyng is
almost impossible to meet; however, even the Supreme Court stated that the
Government’s actions “could have devastating effects on traditional Indian
religious practices.”131 Nevertheless, the Court in Lyng refused to
acknowledge that the longstanding and “extremely grave” effects justified a
halt to the government’s construction of a road through a forest used for
religious purposes. Instead, it brushed the effects aside, agonizing that the
“government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every
citizen’s religious needs and desires.”132 Under the current framework, if
asserting the diminishment of a Native American’s ability to practice his
religious beliefs, courts look to an almost unreachable standard that makes
such claims very unlikely to succeed from the outset. The key factor of why
the Court used its chosen reasoning is the fact that the land was not owned
by the Tribe, and their “rights do not divest the Government of its right to
use what is, after all, its land.”133 The certainty and unyielding reasoning in
Lyng makes Native American assertions of religious objections
unsuccessful, even where it shows a “substantial burden” on its free
exercise of religion.
Second, a key reason why religious objections to energy development
often fail is because real property rights are rarely demonstrated or asserted
in Native American religious claims. Numerous cases have favorable
results for the government largely because the land in question was not
owned by the Native American tribe. First, in Standing Rock, the land in
question was merely near the Tribe’s reservation.134 Second, Navajo Nation
involved a claim on federally-owned land operated under a permit by the

129. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 239 F. Supp. 3d 77,
91 (D.D.C. 2017).
130. Id. at 93.
131. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988).
132. Id. at 451-52.
133. Id. at 453.
134. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 239 F. Supp. 3d 77,
80 (D.D.C. 2017).
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U.S. Forest Service and used by a commercial ski resort.135 Third, in
Slockish, a sacred site containing burial grounds was threatened, but the
land was federally owned and operated by the Bureau of Land
Management.136 Fourth, Lyng dealt with a license to harvest timber on land
owned by the government and the associated effects on a burial ground.137
Fifth, in Apache Stronghold, a Native American group claimed that a land
conveyance from the government to mining companies violated an 1852
Treaty, but the property was held to not have any duty assigned to it as
claimed, therefore absolving the group from any effective property rights.138
Sixth, in Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, although there was a claim that a
waterfall was affected and was under different regulations because it was a
“Traditional Cultural Property”, the real location creating the effect was a
hydroelectric dam, and the Native American Tribe did not possess any
property interest.139 None of these cases involve any valid claims of
property interest; without such an interest, courts are likely to look down
upon these claims. A sufficiently substantial burden in most courts requires
claimants to either be coerced to “act contrary to their religious beliefs” or
the conditioning of “a government benefit upon conduct that would violate
their religious beliefs.”140 However, there is a hidden requirement. When
there is no real property right at issue in the claim, the government and
courts are less understanding of what is really at stake for the Native
American religious adherents.
For contrast, Thiry is an example of a court faced with a Native
American claim that involved a valid property interest.141 But even
satisfaction of the hidden element is not determinative. Despite the presence
of valid property rights, the Tenth Circuit instead chose to reason that the
family could move the affected grave and that their religion allowed such
an act, taking a theological argument and stance from “American Indian
spirituality and Christian beliefs.”142 However, Thiry is distinguishable on a

135. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2008).
136. Slockish v. United States Fed. Highway Admin., No. 3:08-CV-01169-YY, 2018 WL
4523135 at *5 (D. Or. Mar. 2, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:08-CV01169-YY, 2018 WL 2875896 (D. Or. June 11, 2018).
137. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).
138. Apache Stronghold v. United States, 519 F. Supp. 3d 591, 600 (D. Ariz. 2021).
139. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. F.E.R.C., 545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008).
140. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008).
141. Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1495 (10th Cir. 1996).
142. Id. at 1496.
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couple of key points. First, the claim involved a family, not a Tribe.143
Second, the Thirys “testified that they will still continue their religious
beliefs and practices even if the condemnation proceeds as planned.”144
Therefore, despite dangerously delving into the theological aspects of their
beliefs, the court determined that the government action imposed no
substantial burden on their beliefs and did not violate RFRA.145
Lastly, the influx of claims by progressive religious groups lessen the
chance that Native American claims will succeed; they are given the same
analysis and have related caselaw in such a way that if one fails, they both
fail. Different than claims by Native American Tribes, progressive religious
groups’ religious objections are generally more strategically planned,
making judicial changes to the current standard unlikely due to the threats
imposed on governmental action. In Adorers, the affected group argued that
the government’s permission for a pipeline to be built through its land
violated its property rights and affected its ability to practice their deeply
held beliefs.146 However, although the court did not decide the merits of the
RFRA claim due to a procedural defect, related caselaw hints that the court
will deny such a claim.147 Similar claims will ultimately fail under the
established substantial burden test, which focuses on whether members are
sanctioned for exercising their religious beliefs or making them choose
between receiving a government benefit or their religious exercise.148
As demonstrated by these cases, courts are reluctant to find substantial
burdens when the government allows the development of natural
resources.149 Nonetheless, because Native American and progressive
religious claims are lumped together in cases such as the Dakota Access
Pipeline, their outcomes are likely to be hand-in-hand with each other. In
reality, Native American claims are more likely to be firmly rooted in
sincere religious beliefs than those claimed by progressive religious groups.
These claims do not merely flow with the political winds; rather, they are
143. Id. at 1493.
144. Id. at 1495.
145. Id. at 1496.
146. Adorers of the Blood of Christ v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm'n, 897 F.3d 187, 190
(3d Cir. 2018).
147. See United States v. Hoffman, No. MJ-17-0339-TUC-BGM, 2018 WL 2464115 at
*3 (D. Ariz. June 1, 2018) (citing United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir.
2016)).
148. See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 239 F. Supp. 3d
77, 91 (D.D.C. 2017).
149. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 at 1069-70 (9th Cir.
2008).
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longstanding and often originating from time immemorial.150 Due to the
links binding these two groups, courts are rarely able to distinguish between
them because they fail to genuinely analyze sincerity. Additionally, when
these groups are linked together, courts do a disservice to the drastically
different natures of the claims—historic and sincere versus recent and
politically-infused. For example, in Yoder the Court distinguished between
beliefs that are “philosophical and personal rather than religious.”151 If a
court was to distinguish between beliefs and evaluate whether a claim was
rooted in religion, a claim by a Native American Tribe such as in Standing
Rock should be more likely to succeed than its counterpart claimed by a
progressive religious group. Cementing this important distinction would
lead to a more accurate analysis of the real value of the belief and immense
burden placed on Native American religion when resource development
drastically affects their religious beliefs.
Further, accepting some claims would not manifest the crippling
concerns laid out in Smith: that having too loose of a substantial burden test
“would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious objections
from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”152 However, the
Court laid out the types of cases it was concerned with: military service,
taxes, manslaughter and child neglect laws, vaccination, drug laws, traffic
laws, social welfare, child labor, animal cruelty, the environment, and racial
discrimination.153 Clearly, none of these involve a Native American group
protecting its ability to practice its religious beliefs against the government
permitting resource development. Additionally, because of the longstanding
nature of many Native American beliefs, there is even less of a risk that the
belief would be “draping religious garb over [political or philosophical]
activity.”154

150. Compare United States v. Kelly, 2019 WL 5077546 at *7 (S.D. Ga. 2019)
(Defendants being compelled largely by “Pope Francis’s 2017 statement in which he
condemned the very possession of nuclear weapons.”) with Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 239 F.Supp. 3d 77, 87-88 (D.D.C. 2017) (“the pipeline was
the realization of a long-held prophecy about a Black Snake”).
151. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
152. Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
153. Id. at 888-89.
154. See United States v. Hoffman, No. MJ-17-0339-TUC-BGM, 2018 WL 2464115 at
*3 (D. Ariz. June 1, 2018) (citing United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir.
2016)).
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C. Sincerity Analysis
Courts hesitate to question religious sincerity. Indeed, this practice is
proper due to the danger of courts attempting to dissect religious doctrine;
courts have no place in determining the validity of certain religious beliefs.
However, there is still a level of sincerity that is basic to any court applying
First Amendment and RFRA protections, which should be applied to the
differentiation of progressive religious claims and Native American claims.
Longstanding, deeply-rooted beliefs in Native American groups are
plentiful; such beliefs are sparse in progressive religious groups.155 In
Yoder, the Court looked at sincerity and stated that “[a] way of life,
however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to
reasonable state regulation . . . if it is based on purely secular
considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims
must be rooted in religious belief.”156 Courts have indeed meddled with the
sincerity of progressive religious groups, pointing to their purely political
motivation and “simple recitation” of a proclaimed belief.157 This simple act
of applying a more honest look at sincerity would lead to the possibility that
Native American claims can accurately be differentiated from those made
by progressive religious groups.
Moreover, despite many courts’ general hesitation to question sincerity,
they do offer up questions for progressive religious groups.158 Such a
questioning is not coincidental; it is a symptom of the inherent nature of
such beliefs that muddle the line between genuine and purely political.
However, courts are not certain how or where to draw the line at this time.
Some have refused to even consider sincerity if a belief is merely claimed
by supposed religious adherents.159 Others have drawn the line at the clear
fact that a belief is a “simple recitation” implicated to invoke religion as a
legal safeguard.160 Clarity is needed, however, as sincere beliefs deserve
sincere protection.
155. See, supra, Footnote 149.
156. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
157. United States v. Hoffman, 2018 WL 2464115 at *3 (D. Ariz. 2018).
158. See, e.g. United States v. Hoffman, 2018 WL 2464115 at *2-3 (D. Ariz. 2018)
(analyzing whether claims by progressive religious group was “actually religious in nature
(rather than philosophical or political)”).
159. See, e.g. United States v. Kelly, 2019 WL 5077546 at *22 (S.D. Ga. 2019) (the court
having “no doubt” that defendants “sincerely” holds religious beliefs that “nuclear weapons
and the United States Government’s possession of such weapons are not simply undesirable
but are fundamentally evil and sinful”).
160. See United Stated v. Hoffman, 2018 WL 2464115 at *3 (D. Ariz. 2018).
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IV. Future Developments
A. The Not-So-Longstanding Caselaw Affecting Relevant Claims
The caselaw surrounding the free exercise of religion is seeing
developments that may strengthen protections for sincere religious
practices. Two cases may change the nature of the law surrounding the Free
Exercise Clause: Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,161 and Kennedy v.
Bremerton School District.162 First, Fulton may have been part of a general
signal that the “newly reconstituted Roberts Court moved to the right in the
2020-2021 term.”163 The Supreme Court in Fulton held that Philadelphia
substantially burdened a Catholic adoption agency’s religious exercise by
making it violate its religious beliefs in order to receive the government’s
cooperation.164 Additionally, the Court heard an important case in Kennedy
v. Bremerton School District.165 Kennedy concerned a public high school
football coach who desired to pray on the field after games.166 The case at
first did not fare well for the coach, as the Ninth Circuit held that the coach
“spoke as a public employee when he kneeled and prayed.”167 However, the
Court held that the coach had a right to pray, and it overturned the Lemon
doctrine.168 These influential cases may signal that the Court is willing to
overturn Smith, changing the nature of the law surrounding the Free
Exercise Clause. If such a change occurs, there may indeed be new
opportunities for Native American claims to succeed with something other
than the substantial burden test being applied.
B. How Developments Will Affect the Future and These Cases
An overturning of Employment Division v. Smith may render RFRA
meaningless if it results in a stronger framework outlining the free exercise
of religion. A changed nature of the substantial burden test and analysis
could drastically alter the way religious objections to resource development
could be approached. However, there will likely be a continued hesitance of
courts to allow the success of religious objections to resource development.
161. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
162. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 857 (2022).
163. Amy Howe, Looking Ahead: A Post-Covid Return-and A Shift to the Right?, Cato
Sup. Ct. Rev., 2020-2021 at 263 (2021).
164. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1876 (2021).
165. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 2407 (2022).
166. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2017).
167. Id. at 831.
168. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2427-28 (2022)
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Indeed, relevant cases occurred before Smith and the implementation of
RFRA.169 Nevertheless, the long-term solution to potential changes in the
nature of religious liberty caselaw should be accompanied with courts’
willingness to ensure the base-level of sincerity is met in religious
objections to resource development. When claims implicate governmental
action and harm is a byproduct of such action, it is improper to ignore the
claim and reason that no government action could occur if such objections
were granted. Therefore, despite the potential for change in the law, courts’
adoption of a base-level sincerity analysis and related understanding of the
inherent property interest in Native American claims will lead to more
consistent and rational outcomes.
C. The Implications of Progressive Religious Claims on Religious Liberty
As stated, claims by progressive religious groups negatively affect the
ability of Native American claims to succeed. Progressive religious claims
lack the required level of sincerity that has shaped and worsened the
caselaw available to Native American claimants. These holdings enshrine
longstanding negative implications on the success of future religious
objections.
Progressive religious groups assert claims that are often too closely
created in response to political events to convincingly establish the basic
threshold of sincerity. In Adorers, after a pipeline’s path was determined to
cross over the land of a progressive religious group of nuns, the nuns built a
chapel on their land “as an expression of protest against the taking of their
land.”170 Indeed, the group built the chapel after eminent domain legal
proceedings had already begun.171 To evaluate similar cases, courts should
employ similar language as in Yoder and Meyers and take into account the
durability of the alleged religious belief and whether such a belief is rooted
in a bona fide religion. Although there are other Catholic orders that have
some sort of land ethic,172 there still needs to be a sincere religious belief
rooted in a bona fide religion in order to qualify; most claims by
progressive religious groups, including the Adorers, should fail on at least
one of those requirements. They are either so inherently rooted and
169. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988).
170. Adorers of the Blood of Christ, Adorers: Latest Pipeline Ruling a Disappointment
(Sept. 30, 2021), https://adorers.org/adorers-latest-pipeline-ruling-a-disappointment/.
171. Id.
172. Diana Stanley, Prayers and Pipelines: RFRA's Possible Role in Environmental
Litigation, 30 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 89, 111 (2021).
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motivated by something other than a bona fide religion,173 or are simply
insincere and more politically motivated or compelled.174 Instead, in
Adorers, the court did not determine whether the nuns met the basic
threshold of sincerity to qualify as a bona fide religion.175 However, in this
case, it is one of a lack of sincerity rooted in a bona fide religion, and the
court should have used its established analysis instead of avoiding the
question on procedural grounds.
Cases involving a religious claim that is spontaneous or evidently more
of a philosophical or political motivation should be evaluated using similar
considerations as the Court considered in Yoder. For example, in Yoder, the
Court stated that the Amish’s traditional way of life was “not merely a
matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared
by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living.”176 But the
Court did not stop there, further stating that a “philosophical and personal
rather than religious” belief does not meet the requirements of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment.177 In the case of a claim asserted by a
progressive religious group like the anti-submarine protesters in Kelly,
courts should focus on whether the actions are genuinely rooted in a
religious belief or are more philosophical or political than in a genuinely
sincere religious belief.178 Additionally, courts could be more willing to
look at the base-level sincerity of a group when their own stated goal for
their supposed religious action is to protest against the government on a
purely secular activist claim.179 Despite the difficulty in parsing out sincere
from insincere beliefs,180 it is essential to an even-handed approach of
Native American religious claims.
Similarly, courts could follow along the lines of Meyers to determine
whether beliefs stem from a bona fide religion. The court in Meyers
recognized the sincerity of a “Church of Marijuana” member, but it also
173. See United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1482 (10th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing
between beliefs that sincerely held and burdened and beliefs that are sincerely held and
religious “rather than a philosophy or way of life”).
174. See United States v. Hoffman, No. MJ-17-0339-TUC-BGM, 2018 WL 2464115 at
*3 (D. Ariz. June 1, 2018).
175. See Adorers of the Blood of Christ v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm'n, 897 F.3d 187,
197 (3d Cir. 2018) (footnote 10).
176. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
177. Id.
178. See United States v. Kelly, 2019 WL 5077546 at *20 (S.D. Ga. 2019).
179. See, Supra, Note 168.
180. See Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 54 (10th Cir. 2014) (“trying to separate the
sacred from the secular can be a tricky business”).
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stated that it “cannot rely on his sincerity to conclude that his beliefs rise to
the level of a ‘religion’ and therefore trigger RFRA’s protections.”181 As
stated, courts will consider ultimate ideas, metaphysical beliefs, a moral or
ethical system, the comprehensiveness of beliefs, and accoutrements of
religion to determine whether or not the claimed beliefs are actually
religious.182 If courts were willing to apply this analysis to beliefs that are
spontaneous and instituted in direct reaction to a purely political sentiment,
many objections would be weeded out from those that deserve
accommodation.
D. The Path Forward for Courts
In future Free Exercise decisions, the Supreme Court needs to settle the
question of religious objections to resource development. Otherwise, the
ever-increasing influx of challenges will condemn valid and sincere
religious beliefs by Native Americans with no real alternatives. A test
should differentiate between claims of governmental intrusion on religious
acts and those that involve proactive, politically charged actions that did not
exist before such resource development existed or was proposed.
A test that may solve this dilemma—finding the way of how to allow
sincere Native American claims and disallow void claims by progressive
religious groups—should be the application of a basic look at sincerity to
determine whether the religion is bona fide, and to give more weight to
land-based Native American claims. In effect, the Court should establish a
consideration of sincerity stemming from Yoder to parse out and distinguish
Native American claims from those of progressive religious groups. In
Yoder, the Court analyzed the history of the Amish as an “identifiable
religious sect” and reasoned that it has “demonstrated the sincerity of their
religious beliefs.”183 This same analysis may provide helpful instruction for
future claims against energy development. In the case that a Native
American tribe may claim a religious assertion on a longstanding area or
practice, courts may look at factors including whether the belief is
longstanding, the religion is bona fide, and the claim is not asserted purely
for philosophical reasons. The sincerity of the Amish beliefs in Yoder is
similar enough to Native American beliefs that courts should also be able to
look toward a longstanding, genuine, and demonstrated religious belief and

181. United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1508 (D. Wyo. 1995), aff'd, 95 F.3d
1475 (10th Cir. 1996).
182. United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1483 (10th Cir. 1996).
183. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972).
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require government infringement on the beliefs to be the least restrictive
means—or prevent infringement altogether.
V. Conclusion
Seeking to protect their religion from resource development, and
pleading for First Amendment and RFRA protections, Native American
groups have been passed over. Despite the sincerity of their claims, courts
consistently hold that Native American objections lack a substantial burden
sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny and limit the government’s actions to the
least restrictive means for a compelling interest. Additionally, courts
wrongfully apply a similar analysis to evaluate the claims of progressive
religious groups in their objections against energy development. However,
courts ought not evaluate these claims too simply; doing so does not
accurately account for a genuine sincerity in such objections. The growing
number of claims and affected groups demands a different approach. Courts
should determine whether or not the religion is bona fide in order to allow
Native American tribes to have a chance at successfully claiming a
religious objection to energy development. Holding that all objections are
sincere—without a bona fide determination and look at whether or not the
practice is motivated by purely political or philosophical reasons—leaves
Native American groups with an inability to distinguish their beliefs from
progressives. To uphold the Constitution’s promised protections, courts
must consider the nature of Native American religion—that which holds
property very differently than Western ideals—and apply its understanding
to the substantial burden analysis in order to accurately determine whether
religious objections should succeed. Without change, Native American
groups will sink with progressive religious groups; Native American claims
will continue to fall victim to government overreach because their claims
will be called “burdened,” but not burdened enough.
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